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1. Introduction
Emmanuel Levinas makes every effort to mark what is distinctive in 
his account of intersubjectivity and the second person. He proposes and 
experiments with numerous terms for the relation, and he uses various 
expressions that emphasize and even exaggerate its distinctiveness. At 
the same time, he notices others in western philosophical and religious 
thought who have taken intersubjectivity to play a central role in their 
thinking and who are for this reason his compatriots—figures like 
Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel.1 It is natural to add to this list those 
two figures in the tradition of German Idealism who give pride of place 
to the second-person encounter: Hegel and Fichte. Some have gone so far 
as to say that once we have their accounts on hand, Levinas’ treatment 
is unnecessary, redundant, or even defective. In this paper we aim to 
compare Fichte and Levinas with this warning in mind and show how, 
for all their differences, Levinas and Fichte share important affinities.
From an early stage in his career, Levinas had Hegel in mind as a 
primary representative of the tradition of western philosophy and as 
someone from whose work he wanted to distinguish his own. Fichte does 
not seem to have been on his mind at this early stage, but there are 
two places in “Substitution,” chapter 4 of Otherwise Than Being (1974), 
where he mentions Fichte by name.2 In this chapter, Levinas introduces 
the term “exteriority” to describe the way in which the other influences 
us without that influence tracing back to the subject. He writes: 
This relationship is not an act, not a thematization, not a position in the 
Fichtean sense [n’est pas position au sens fichtéen]. Not everything that 
is in consciousness would be posited by consciousness—contrary to the 
proposition that seemed to Fichte to be fundamental. (OB 101; AE 127) 
Levinas then goes on to ask how the subject can be affected by the 
other. This is where we find a second reference: “How can the Fichtean 
free ego undergo the suffering that would come to it from the non-
ego” (OB 123; AE 159)?3 The point that Levinas underscores in both 
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of these passages is that the other’s encounter with the subject is not 
the outcome of the subject’s freedom; it is not posited by the subject, as 
Fichte has it, but is prior to any free activity. In short, what Levinas 
rejects is Fichte’s idealism; he rejects his starting point.4
A comprehensive examination of Levinas’ criticism of Fichte would 
have to examine more than this line of objection. It would also have 
to consider more fully Fichte’s doctrine of right, his theory of ethics, 
and the special role that intersubjectivity plays in both. It would then 
have to consider the ways in which Levinas’ own account differs. This 
is certainly too large a task for a single paper, but we shall attempt 
to make a few, hopefully fruitful, steps in this direction. One striking 
result that will emerge from our comparison is that both Levinas and 
Fichte end up viewing the second person in a way that has no equivalent 
in the current philosophical literature.5 As we shall see, they each view 
responsibility to the other, not only as an immediate obligation but as 
an asymmetrical relation that gives the other moral priority.6
2. Fichte on the Summons and Intersubjectivity
Scholarship on Fichte’s doctrine of the “summons” (Aufforderung) is 
substantial and conflicted.7 Daniel Breazeale, for example, argues that the 
concept of the summons first occurs in Fichte’s Foundations of Natural 
Right (1795–96), although there is some indication that he had pointed 
to the importance of the second person in his Foundation of the Entire 
Wissenschaftslehre (1794–95).8 In his comments, Breazeale begins by 
describing Fichte’s “famous demonstration that the very possibility of self-
consciousness depends upon one’s consciousness of oneself not simply as an 
‘I as such’ but as a determinate individual person” and that “this in turn 
. . . [depends] upon one’s recognition of other free individuals . . . that is 
accomplished and signaled by the voluntary self-limitation of one’s own 
freedom out of respect for the freedom of others.”9 Breazeale then makes 
special note of its context in the Foundations of Natural Right, stating 
that this demonstration “provides the foundation for a new account 
of juridical rights as conditions for the possibility of a community of 
mutually recognizing and self-limiting free individuals.”10
Complications arise as soon as we try to locate the summons within the 
structure of Fichte’s overall account. There are at least three places where 
it occurs: (1) in the self’s positing of the not-I; (2) in the self’s positing of a 
subject that issues the summons; and (3) in the self’s positing of another 
rational being. But how does Fichte understand each of these three stages 
in his transcendental account of the conditions for the possibility of 
self-consciousness? Exactly what does the summons add to the positing 
of the not-I and the determination that it provides for the self as free 
MORGAN & WARE/SECOND PERSON IN FICHTE AND LEVINAS
3
activity? And how does it lead to the external, other person—the other 
free and rational being—and the self’s relation to it?
These are among the questions that any complete account of Fichte’s 
deduction must answer. Let us start with the proof for the second theorem 
in Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right. The theorem is this: “The finite 
rational being cannot ascribe to itself a free efficacy in the sensible world 
without also ascribing such efficacy to others, and thus without also 
presupposing the existence of other finite rational beings outside of itself” 
(FNR 29; GN 30). In other words, a rational subject cannot take itself to be 
acting freely without also taking other free rational beings to be doing the 
same and hence without also “presupposing” finite rational beings other 
than itself. Prior to this in the text, Fichte had argued that a finite rational 
subject cannot take itself to act freely unless it takes itself to be acting 
on an independently existing object, which limits that subject’s activity 
(FNR 18–29; GN 17–29). He now claims that the subject’s consciousness of 
its own activity—its taking itself to be acting freely—depends upon prior 
consciousness of free activity; but this chain cannot extend back infinitely, 
each such moment of consciousness depending upon a prior one, without 
end. At some point, this consciousness of the subject’s activity must be 
grounded beyond itself. For if it were not, “consciousness can be explained 
only circularly; thus, it cannot be explained at all, and so it appears to be 
impossible” (FNR 29–30; GN 30). But, and this is crucial, the consciousness 
of the subject’s free activity must be grounded both beyond itself and 
within itself. For this reason, the main purpose of Fichte’s deduction is 
to show how the relation between the object of the free activity and that 
activity itself must be understood as a kind of “synthesis”; this is why his 
proof directs us first to a summons and then to another person who issues 
that summons. The subject can be determined only if it determines itself, 
and it can do this only if it is summoned by another to do so. 
The core of Fichte’s argument takes up only a few pages in his account, 
but they are a very dense set of pages indeed (FNR 30–5; GN 30–7). What 
we need is an object that is both an object of the subject’s free activity and, 
in a sense, the very same as that free activity. As Fichte puts it, 
only if it is assumed that the subject’s efficacy is synthetically uni-
fied with the object in one and the same moment, that the subject’s 
efficacy is itself the object that is perceived and comprehended, and 
that the object is nothing other than the subject’s efficacy (and thus 
that the two are same). (FNR 31; GN 32)
This synthesis, unity, or identity is the “absolute condition of self-
consciousness” (FNR 31; GN 32). Fichte’s point is that the subject is 
a subject only if it acts freely and is aware of itself as acting, but that 
requires the subject to act on something—call it the “object.” However, 
if the object is other than the subject, it must already be grasped by the 
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subject prior to the subject recognizing itself as acting. The only way to 
terminate this regress or to interrupt this circle is to identify an object 
that is both other than the subject and related to it. And this is what 
leads Fichte to the concept of the “summons.”
3. Fichte on Positing: Discovery or Creation?
In the next section, we shall turn to the summons and then to the key 
inference that takes Fichte from this concept to the other freely active 
subject that issues it. But it might be helpful to anticipate two ways of 
challenging Fichte’s deduction. 
First, we can see that Fichte is treating the summons as having two 
aspects: the subjective and the objective. A summons is an object of a 
subject’s activity only if it in some way determines that activity and 
in this sense is identical with the activity as determined. At the same 
time, that determination cannot wholly be the product of the subject’s 
activity itself; it must be a determining that comes from outside the 
subject. A “summons” or “call” or “claim” must be aimed at a subject 
and also come from another subject. Fichte’s argument requires that 
a summons have these two aspects, but one can easily imagine the 
criticism that such a claim is tendentious and is itself an argument 
that raises the question it is tailored to answer. Fichte believes that a 
subject’s awareness of its own free activity requires a special kind of 
object that is also identical to itself, but one might protest that Fichte 
has not discovered such an object as much as created one. We will 
return to this kind of criticism of Fichte below, but for the moment let 
us turn to a second, related challenge, which may very well be the one 
that Levinas, in his two comments on Fichte, is calling to our attention.
Levinas’ challenge to Fichte concerns the notion of “positing.”11 What 
kind of activity is this? Is positing a form of discovery or is it a form 
of constitution? In the present case of the summons, does the subject 
discover a summons or does it constitute such an object? The way 
Levinas describes his disagreement with Fichte in Otherwise Than 
Being suggests that this is the kind of criticism that he has in mind. For 
Levinas, the other as the absolutely other, the face of the other person, 
is given to the self as an “epiphany”: its moral bindingness in part comes 
from the fact that its wholly other character is an imposition, a claim, and 
a “putting into question,” as he describes it (TI 75; TI 73). On Levinas’ 
reading, what Fichte means by positing is an act of cognitive creation. 
Both the summons and the other person who issues it are products of 
the only agency available in Fichte’s system, the free agency of the I as 
such. In short, while Levinas is very much a realist about the other—
specifically, what he would call a Platonic realist—, he challenges Fichte 
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for being an uncompromising idealist, and for this reason a philosopher 
of totality.
For his part, Fichte is aware that identifying the most suitable object 
of the subject’s efficacy is problematic. The very same object must be itself 
free and yet constrained, self-determining and yet determined. What 
kind of object might have these seemingly contradictory properties? 
Fichte never says that one and the same thing must be constrained and 
free in the same way or in the same act or in the same respect; it would 
be sufficient if the same thing were constrained in one respect and free 
in another. It is therefore not surprising that he suggests that the subject 
and object are “unified if we think of the subject’s being determined as 
its being-determined to be self-determining [ein Bestimmtseyn des Subjects 
zur Selbstbestimmung],” and hence if we take the object to be “a summons 
to the subject, calling upon it to resolve to exercise its efficacy” (FNR 31; 
GN 33). The appropriate object that unifies the external and the internal 
is a call to the subject to respond by acting freely. But then we must ask: 
How can the subject’s self-awareness be simultaneously constrained 
and the object of a free subject?
Fichte takes up this puzzle in a long, two-paragraph parenthesis 
(FNR 32–3; GN 33–4). His basic idea, we may recall, is that in order 
for this object, the “summons,” to be both subject and object, we must 
distinguish between the subject as determined and the subject as self-
determining. The latter is unproblematic, for it is what we would expect 
of a subject that is self-conscious, that is, conscious of itself as a freely 
active being. The former, however, is problematic. How can the subject 
be aware of itself as an object, as being-determined? Fichte’s answer 
is this: only if the subject finds itself “as determined to be self-active by 
means of an external check [Anstoss], which must nevertheless leave the 
subject in full possession of its freedom to be self-determining” (FNR 
32; GN 33). This possibility is about something external to the subject 
that is a constraint but that at the same time leaves “the subject in full 
possession of its freedom” (FNR 32; GN 33). Whatever this check is, 
it cannot necessitate the subject to act, for if it did, then the subject’s 
activity would not be free. Whatever the external object is that is present 
to the subject, it must make it possible for the subject to act freely 
toward it, but at the same time allow it to refrain from acting as well. 
Hence, Fichte seems to suggest, the check must be a presence toward 
which the subject can act or refuse to act, which it can appropriate or 
reject, and toward which it can act positively or negatively. It is the idea 
of a summons—a calling upon that is also a demand—that, for Fichte, 
captures these twin dimensions. It is a constraint that does not simply 
prevent, block or limit; it also provokes a form of activity.
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4. Fichte’s Inference to Another Rational Being
This brings us to the final step of Fichte’s deduction. What the self-
conscious subject has posited so far is the summons, and the point Fichte 
now makes is that there must be something external to the subject that is 
the ground of the summons. This external something must be necessary, 
posited simultaneously with the summons, and sensibly expressed, much 
like the summons. Fichte here calls the summons an “influence” on the 
subject, and he argues that this influence must be determinate (FNR 
34; GN 35–6). The summons cannot, however, determine the subject 
causally; rather, it must appeal to the subject to determine itself, as we just 
noted. But this means that the subject to whom the summons is addressed 
must first be able to “understand and comprehend” the summons, and 
thus “the external being that is posited as the cause of the summons must 
at the very least presuppose the possibility that the subject is capable of 
understanding and comprehending; otherwise its summons to the subject 
would have no purpose at all” (FNR 35; GN 36). The being that issues the 
summons must itself have a concept of the subject to whom the summons 
is issued, and therefore the being must itself be an intelligence.12 
Later on, Fichte tells us that the positing of the summons is part of 
an exposition and so is a mere philosophical elucidation of what self-
consciousness requires, namely a synthesis of being determined and 
determining itself (FNR 31; GN 33). Yet he also says that the summons 
cannot be an object of inner sense; it must be an object of outer sense 
and the cause of the summons must also be an external cause (FNR 32; 
GN 33). In light of Levinas’ criticism, then, we must ask: Is this still to 
treat positing as discovery? Or has Fichte simply helped himself to the 
notion of “externality,” so that it is hard to say that the summoner is a 
genuinely independent being? Levinas takes our subjectivity to require 
an independent being and claims as well that the summons to which 
his account points must be imposed and not posited. But, as we shall 
see, Levinas’ criticism rests largely on his doubts that Fichte’s account 
provides access to an independently existing other person.
5. The Target of Levinas’ Criticism of Fichte 
Levinas’ conception of the “face” is precisely the conception of a real, 
existing other person, and for that reason the face cannot be an object 
of reflection in any ordinary way. As Levinas puts it, it is beyond 
intentionality in the Husserlian sense and thus beyond comprehension. 
To be sure, we engage with and encounter other persons in our daily 
lives but relating to “the face of the other [le visage de l’autre]” is to 
reach, somehow, beyond the boundaries of concepts, reason, and all 
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the determinations that make up ordinary experience.13 It is vital for 
Levinas that we encounter others in both ways. Even without further 
elaboration, then, it should be clear that what Levinas means by the 
absolute alterity of the face of the other and what Fichte means by 
the other rationally free agent, who must be posited if the subject is 
to be free, are not one and the same. Moreover, the Levinasian relation 
to the other is not the same connection as the Fichtean relation to the 
other rational agent. It is no wonder that Levinas’ criticism of Fichte is a 
criticism of his idealism. To him, Fichte simply presents an earlier version 
of the positions Hegel, Heidegger, and so many others in the tradition of 
western philosophy that Levinas disparagingly calls “autonomous.” 
We can now distinguish three levels at which to compare Levinas 
and Fichte. One is the metaphysical level (concerning first principles); 
a second is the legal level (concerning rights); and a third is the moral 
level (concerning duties). As we noted above, Levinas’ passing comments 
about Fichte concern primarily the metaphysical level. He takes the 
face of the other person to be absolutely different from what Fichte 
calls the “I as such,” and he claims, in a highly idiosyncratic way, that the 
subject’s relation to that absolute other is wholly passive, receptive, and 
orienting. Moreover, Levinas takes Fichte to deny that such otherness 
is possible and disagrees with Fichte’s denial that there is anything 
in consciousness that is not posited by consciousness (OB 101; AE 
127). The subject does have a “relationship with exteriority” that is 
of a different sort, which he calls by a host of terms, among them 
“obsession,” “substitution,” “proximity,” and “responsibility” (OB 100–
1, 113–8, 124; AE 127, 144–56, 159). Levinas says nothing, however, 
about the legal and moral levels of Fichte’s thought. Yet it is here that 
we gain insight into a number of affinities in how Levinas and Fichte 
view second-person responsibility. 
6. The Role of Sociality in Fichte’s System of Ethics
Fichte introduces the social character of human existence in the second 
section of The System of Ethics (1798), titled “The Material Content 
of the Moral Law, or Systematic Survey of Our Duties.”14 Here Fichte 
seeks to examine the conditions of action available to us in the sensible 
world that give substance to the moral law and its final end. As he 
puts it, “the final end of the moral law is absolute independence and 
self-sufficiency, not merely with respect to our will, for the latter is always 
independent, but also with respect to our entire being” (SE 198–9; SS 
209). Actions that move us along the path toward complete self-sufficiency 
are those that the moral law will require of us. In this sense, our duties are 
those actions that the I and its rational nature determine to be the best 
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path to self-sufficiency. But since we cannot will the totality of our drive 
to self-sufficiency all at once, every determinate duty will be limited in its 
content. The question Fichte puts before us, then, is: What limitations are 
constitutive of the individual I as such? To act upon these limitations—“to 
preserve them and to bring them to perfection,” as he puts it—will yield 
material content for the moral law (SE 76; SS 75).15
In The System of Ethics, Fichte identifies three limitations: corporeity 
(the condition of the I’s embodiment) (SE 203–6; SS 213–7), spontaneity 
(the condition of the I’s intelligence) (SE 209–10; SS 219–21), and 
sociality (the condition of the I’s relation with others) (SE 210–3; SS 
221–5). Concerning the last, Fichte reminds us that the individual I 
must be limited, and since the I is free activity, it must be limited by 
another free activity:
The I is absolutely unable to appropriate to itself any free activity 
unless the latter is a quantum, and—given that every quantum is 
necessarily limited—the I is therefore unable to appropriate to it-
self any free activity without at the same time positing, along with 
this act of thinking . . . another free activity, one which, to this 
extent, does not belong to the I. (SE 208; SS 219)
Yet, as Fichte goes on to explain, this limiting free activity cannot be 
a merely imaginable activity of another I. It must be a real and actual 
free activity of another I, and hence when I take myself to be free, I find 
myself to be free precisely insofar as this other activity limits my own 
freedom. Fichte’s point is that when the I becomes conscious of itself—
as free activity—that activity must already be in place; the subject’s 
self-consciousness does not make it so but finds it so. And this means 
that there must be another freely acting being that limits the subject. 
As Fichte puts it: 
To say, “my self-determination is present without any help from 
me,” can mean only that it is present as a concept, or, in short, that 
I am summoned [aufgefordert] to determine myself in this way. Just 
as surely as I understand this summons, I also think of my self-
determination as something given in this summons; and I am given 
to myself as free in the concept of this summons. (SE 209; SS 220)
In grasping a summons, then, I am both determined by it and determine 
myself to act in response to it. This brings Fichte to the next step of his 
argument, which is the claim that “I cannot comprehend the summons to 
self-activity without ascribing it to an actual being outside of myself” (SE 
209; SS 220). Here, as in the Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte moves 
from an exposition of the summons to an inference of its source, that 
is, to the rational and free being issuing the summons, and then to the 
conclusion that “it is a condition of self-consciousness, of I-hood, to assume 
that there is an actual rational being outside of oneself” (SE 210; SS 221). 
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But what is the new moral dimension of this argument? What follows from 
the fact that my individuality is dependent on another rational being who 
summons me? It could be argued that Fichte’s treatment of the summons 
gets us no further than a descriptive claim about how we are constituted 
in a second-person relation, without getting us to a prescriptive claim 
about how we ought to regulate our conduct within that relation. Yet, 
this assertion overlooks the fact that Fichte’s strategy of argument in 
The System of Ethics is teleological: it asks what limitations make up the 
individual I, and what ways of acting upon those limitations approximate 
the final end of the moral law, that is, absolute self-sufficiency. This is how 
Fichte moves from corporeity as a necessary condition of my individuality 
to the conclusion that I have a duty to preserve and perfect my body, 
and likewise, how he moves from spontaneity as a necessary condition 
of my individuality to the conclusion that I have a duty to preserve and 
perfect my mind. Having established that the freedom of the other who 
summons me is also a necessary condition of my individuality, it follows 
from Fichte’s line of argument that I have a duty to preserve and perfect 
the freedom of the other.
This does not mean that duties to others and duties to body or 
duties to mind are equal in normative weight; and this point is crucial. 
Fichte argues that sociality is unlike the limitations of my corporeity 
and spontaneity in that the former constitutes “the root [Wurzel] of my 
individuality” (SE 211; SS 222). While I cannot exist either without a 
body or without a mind, my capacity for free efficacy is conditioned by 
the summons of another, and for that reason the limitation imposed 
upon me by the other is a deeper condition for being a self. But what 
does this entail? 
The conclusion Fichte draws here has far-reaching implications for his 
ethics, since he ends up affirming the asymmetry of self-other obligations 
in a way that puts him in closer proximity to Levinas. All duties, Fichte 
now argues, have the freedom of others as their point of reference—that 
is, the material content for the self-sufficiency of reason as such (SE 220; 
SS 231). Actions that pertain to the preservation and perfection of the 
self are “mediated” or “conditioned”: they are means to an end beyond 
the individual I, the rational community outside of me (SE 246; SS 
257). Thus, the drive to self-sufficiency is not limited to the particular 
individual’s freedom; it is, instead, the end of reason itself, and since 
this end of reason is everyone’s ultimate goal, it must be realized in the 
duties of reciprocity found in a moral community, or what Fichte calls 
the principles of the “reciprocal interaction of everyone with everyone 
for the purpose of producing communally shared convictions” (SE 
224; SS 236). Obligations to others therefore enjoy primacy in Fichte’s 
ethics, and he is quite explicit about this: “This ought to be the goal of 
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all our thinking and acting, and even of our individual cultivation: our 
final end is not ourselves but everyone” (SE 241; SS 253).16
7. Responsibility for the Other in Levinas
To deepen our comparison, let us now turn to consider Levinas’ view 
of ethics. A good place to start is his paper “Philosophy and the Idea 
of Infinity,” which claims that Descartes’ position is an anticipation of 
the face-to-face encounter and a confirmation of an alternative tradition 
in western philosophy. It is well-known to readers of Levinas that his 
appeal to Descartes’ conception of the “idea of the Infinite” is to its 
formal character and not to its role in Descartes’ Third Meditation, 
where Descartes presents an argument for the existence of God.17 
Levinas is making note of Descartes’ belief that we do in fact have an 
idea of the Infinite and hence that there is a relation between the subject, 
specifically the subject’s consciousness, and the Infinite itself.18 We can 
and do think the Infinite, and while our conscious grasp of such an idea 
is within our control, the fact that it is “of the Infinite” cannot be up 
to us but must be “caused” by the Infinite itself. In short, Descartes’ 
“idea of the Infinite” is formally about the relation between the subject 
and something absolutely different, the Infinite itself. In traditional 
theological terms, the “idea of the Infinite” expresses the immanence in 
the human of divine transcendence. And in Levinas’ metaphysical terms, 
it expresses the relation between the subject and the absolutely other. 
Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, claims that while Descartes attests to 
such a foundational relationship, he mistakes its character. To Descartes, 
the relation is cognitive or epistemic, while Levinas claims that it is in 
reality ethical (TI 211; TI 232–3). This self-transcendence is realized 
not in thought but rather in the practical relation between one person 
and another. It is this aspect of our social relations that gives rise to our 
responsibility to each and every other person, precisely insofar as it gives 
rise to the other person’s “calling into question” of the self, that is, the 
plea for acknowledgement and acceptance. Even this brief paraphrase 
of the “idea of the Infinite” in Levinas is suggestive. For, the absolutely 
other, simply in virtue of its presence to the self, makes an infinite 
claim on the self; it calls out to the other to provide “aid” and “succor,” 
and its call amounts to both a petition and a command, at once. As 
Levinas puts it, the other speaks to the self from a “height” and out of 
its suffering, its nakedness, its nudity, and its vulnerability (TI 75; 
TI 72–3). Responding to the other is, for the self, unavoidable, as is 
responding for the other and being accountable to the other. 
We have not given any arguments for Levinas’ account; in fact, his 
arguments are not direct and decisive as much as they are suggestive 
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and provocative. But enough has been said for us to consider how—and 
whether—Fichte’s “summons” and Levinas’ “idea of the Infinite” might 
be thought to introduce similar features into our idea of the second-person 
relation. An initial observation is that while Fichte’s summons is posited 
by the reflective free agent as a condition for making its free activity 
possible, for Levinas the call is grasped by the subject as the appeal and 
force of the other person’s presence. Moreover, Fichte proceeds to infer 
the other free, rational agent as the source of the summons, whereas 
Levinas takes the self’s obligation to respond to be the way that the 
other is experienced.19 Of course, for Levinas, “experience” is not to be 
taken literally, nor would it be correct to say that the subject “feels,” 
“grasps,” or “understands” the other’s presence. But he does want us 
to appreciate that every interpersonal relation we have involves this 
sense of responsiveness and that the relation to the other is immediate 
and not an inference.
Having said that, we can now consider some of the vocabulary that 
Levinas uses to understand how the other’s presence as appeal does 
inform the identity of the self. Recall that, for Fichte, the “summons” is 
identical with the self as “determined and self-determining.” In the face-
to-face relation, for Levinas, the other determines the self to be responsive 
and hence makes it responsible. If the “objective” side of the face-to-face 
is the other person’s claim on the self and its calling the self into question, 
then the “subjective” side of the face-to-face is the infinite responsibility 
for the other that constitutes the self’s identity. In virtue of the face-
to-face, the self is “substitution for” and “obsession with” and “being 
hostage to” and “being persecuted by” the other. Levinas also calls this 
“disinterestedness,” and he says that the other’s presence “hollows out” 
the self, as it were. These expressions are all from Levinas’ later work—
the essays “Essence and Disinterestedness” and “Substitution,” and his 
book Otherwise Than Being—and what they share is the way in which 
the self, while wholly separate from the other person, is nonetheless 
affected by it—primordially, we might say.20 Its interests, desires, and 
needs are overwhelmed, so that the self starts out, metaphorically 
speaking, as the other person’s custodian and servant, its delegate or 
hostage, both different from the other and yet standing in relation to it. 
It is no surprise that this stratum of all of our interpersonal relations 
is best depicted, for Levinas, not by the relation between two adult 
rational agents but rather by the relation between a new-born infant, 
helpless and needy, and its mother (OB 75, 108; AE 95, 137).
8. The Second-Person Relation
Where does all this leave our comparison? From what we have discussed 
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so far, it seems safe to say that both Fichte and Levinas view the second-
person relation in the following way:
(asymmetry) Second-person responsibility is asymmetrical because 
responsibility to the other takes priority over responsibility to the 
self. Duties to others are primary.
(immediacy) Responsibility to the other is an immediate responsibility 
because it is for its own sake and not for any other aim or end. 
Duties to others are unconditioned.
(particularity) Second-person responsibility concerns a particular 
other. Duties to others are person-to-person.
Among these three views, the last may be less evident in Fichte’s case, 
since he describes our final end in seemingly impersonal terms, “everyone 
[Alle]” (SE 241; SS 253). Yet it is important to observe that, for Fichte, 
we can approximate the self-sufficiency of the rational community only 
by acting in relation to specific others: my duty is always a duty to a 
particular you in any given situation of choice. Indeed, Fichte is opposed 
to making generalized calculations at the interpersonal level, say, about 
what would promote the greatest good for the greatest number of 
persons. Later in The System of Ethics, for example, we are presented 
with a thought experiment in which “the bodies and lives of several 
of my fellow human beings are in danger,” and here Fichte poses the 
difficult question: “How shall I choose whom to save” (SE 289; SS 304)? 
In normal circumstances, he says, I should choose to save those in most 
need of help (“children, sick people and old people”) (ibid.). But if I 
have a personal relationship to one of them, then I should give that 
individual precedence on the grounds that “a particular duty always 
takes precedence over a universal one” (ibid.). However, Fichte argues 
that if no such personal tie is present, “I should rescue the first person I 
can rescue, the first person I see” (ibid.; emphasis added). So even when 
my responsibility is not borne from a personal relationship (as it is, he 
thinks, with one’s spouse or child), I ought never to deliberate from a 
point of view across persons. My obligations remain person-to-person 
in all cases.
What is interesting is that these three overlapping ways of 
viewing second-person responsibility are the product of very different 
argumentative paths. Fichte’s path begins with the first principle of his 
system of ethics, which he says escapes ordinary comprehension but admits 
of an “intellectual intuition” (SE 50; SS 47). We can, as philosophers, 
immediately grasp the self-activity of our own I and thereby postulate the 
self-activity of “the I as such.” It is only when Fichte asks how an individual 
I is possible that he invokes the concept of a summons and argues, as 
we have seen, that an original intersubjective relation lies at the root 
of my finite self. This point is worth emphasizing. The very notion of 
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a second-person relation emerges in The System of Ethics when Fichte 
turns to the question of how the moral law can have material content 
and apply to a set of substantive duties. Prior to this question, Fichte’s 
investigation proceeds strictly from the I as such, which is a thoroughly 
transpersonal concept. Levinas, by contrast, has no first principle, 
at least not in any conventional sense of the term, since the absolute 
alterity of the other does not serve to ground a science of ethics. For 
that reason, it is all the more striking that while Fichte begins with the 
absolute freedom of the I, and Levinas begins with the absolute alterity 
of the other, both end up characterizing the second-person relation in 
terms of asymmetry, immediacy, and particularity.
One can, however, anticipate the criticism from Levinas that Fichte’s 
first principle, his starting point in the I as such, leaves him unable to 
grasp the most important feature of the second-person relation, which 
we might call:
(irreducibility) Responsibility to the other is irreducibly second-per-
sonal: there is, outside this relation, no other source of its normativity. 
For Levinas, the other, and not the I (and certainly not Fichte’s first 
principle of the I) is the source of moral normativity. Respect for the 
other person arises directly as a result of the other’s right to be treated 
with concern, and this right is another way of understanding the self’s 
infinite responsibilities to each and every other person. For Fichte, the 
source of moral normativity is the final end of reason as such, and my 
duties to others come into the picture only when we ask how a command 
to approximate this end can have material content. Particularity is a 
feature of the second-person relation, for Fichte, because absolute self-
sufficiency is an unrealizable ideal; that is why we must always act in 
determinate ways, in relation to our bodies and minds as well as to 
other people. The challenge we can suppose Levinas offering, then, is 
that Fichte’s ethics has no room for genuine responsibility, since the 
orientation of his system, from start to end, is the self-sufficiency of the 
I. We see that, for Levinas, our responsibility to the other is irreducibly 
second-personal only when we start from the absolute alterity of the 
other. The point of origin, we might say, makes all the difference for how 
we understand ethics.
It is not difficult to imagine how Fichte would reply were he presented 
with such an argument. A recurring theme in his writings is that all 
philosophical systems divide into two standpoints: the standpoint of 
idealism, which gives primacy to the I, and the standpoint of dogmatism, 
which gives the thing-in-itself primacy (see, e.g., SE 30–4, 126–30, 214–
7; SS 24–9, 132–6, 225–9). On the basis of this distinction, Fichte would 
likely say that treating the second person as reducible to the principle of 
the I is not a criticism at all but a clear and definitive statement of the 
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system of freedom he wishes to defend. He would likely accuse Levinas 
of denying the freedom of reason, in the manner of the dogmatist, and 
of harboring faith in the “not-I.” At this stage in our comparison, it may 
seem that Fichte and Levinas have lost any common thread to keep 
a dialogue alive. Yet, it is worth pointing out that Levinas is closer to 
the spirit of idealism, at least as Fichte defines it, than to the spirit of 
dogmatism, since he is not reifying the concept of the other or treating 
it as something inert, the thing-in-itself. Levinas’ other and Fichte’s 
I have this much in common: both escape comprehension by ordinary 
understanding and yet both admit of a certain disclosure—either by 
intellectual intuition or by epiphany. 
9. A Final Worry: Levinas on Asymmetry
For Levinas, our obligations to others, the ones we act upon in particular 
circumstances, are the outcome of deciding in those circumstances 
how to respond. Yet, he maintains that our responsibilities to others 
are unlimited. There is no upper limit to the asymmetrical relation of 
responsibility that defines the self and its moral activity in the face-to-
face encounter. On this issue, Fichte would appear to be more faithful 
to the Kantian tradition in leaving room for permissible self-regard, 
and he even distinguishes duties of self-perfection at the bodily and 
cognitive levels of human life, as we touched on above. In the history 
of ethics, Levinas is virtually alone in claiming that the subject’s 
relation to the other is one-way and asymmetrical and that the subject 
is completely bound to the force of the other’s claim on it. Levinas is both 
emphatic and even dramatic in the way he makes this point; he makes it 
again and again and in a host of ways. But it appears to come at the cost 
of excluding symmetry and reciprocity in the second-person relation—
and many today will no doubt find that cost far too high to accept.
Of course, once we see that Levinas associates this view with a strand 
of western thought in which the human encounter with the divine is 
one of total subordination, his position might seem less surprising. It 
might seem that what Levinas provides is a humanistic interpretation 
of a view of divine otherness that one associates with figures from Saint 
Augustine and Martin Luther to Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth in 
the Christian tradition, with neo-Platonism and Descartes, as well as 
with a number of Jewish thinkers. Still, even if Levinas is indebted to 
these intellectual lineages, one can appreciate that privileging such a 
relation with absolute otherness in human intersubjectivity is novel. 
But this view might also strike the contemporary reader as strange. 
For why should we think that every interpersonal encounter involves a 
face-to-face relation, in which the subject is completely passive and the 
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other makes an infinite claim against the subject for acknowledgement, 
acceptance, assistance, and more? Not even Fichte, who is otherwise 
committed to a version of asymmetry, is willing to go this far.
In thinking through Levinas’ position, it is important to begin with 
our ordinary, everyday relations with others and to realize that every 
relation is particular and complex. That is, every relation is an event that 
happens between an I and a particular other person, and it has many 
dimensions: each I has a vast array of determinate relations with every 
person she encounters. Some of these dimensions depend upon special 
relations we have with others; some depend upon circumstances or 
features that we share or that situate us. Our relations, moreover, can 
be described from our first-person perspectives or from a detached, 
third-person perspective. Among this myriad of dimensions, some will 
invite or call for responses on our part. In fact, as Levinas sees it, there 
is a sense in which they all do, and since, for Levinas, we are related to 
every other person in a complex of ways, there is a sense in which each of 
us, as a subject, is infinitely responsive to each and every other person. 
Further, we are not only capable of responding to the other person; we 
ought also to respond, and the “ought” is grounded in the special way that 
each other person “makes a claim against us” or “calls us into question” 
because she depends upon us, needs us, and cannot do without us. 
Levinas makes this point by saying that encountering the face of the other 
person is to be infinitely responsible for and to the other person (TI 244; TI 
273–4). The normativity of this relation is not already present in the myriad 
of ordinary relations we have with others; it comes with this distinctive 
relation, the face-to-face, which is there along with or together with all the 
others. But unlike them, it is not wholly immanent to our natural existence. 
It is present not “horizontally,” we might say, but “vertically.” It comes 
obliquely with every relation and with every particular other. Levinas’ 
picture of second-person normativity is a kind of transcendental one. 
The face of the other is the source of moral normativity, because it brings 
the force of an “ought” into our lives, one that arises out of the very 
particularized dependency of our social relations. As a transcendental 
structure that is wholly normative, the face-to-face relation is never 
realized perfectly or completely in ordinary experience.21 At any moment, 
what we decide and what we do depends upon many considerations, but, 
if we are sensitive to our infinite responsibilities, our decisions and actions 
will be guided by this orientation and the particular claims of others, 
whose presence we take to be relevant to our decisions and our conduct. 
Returning to the worry that Levinas’ commitment to asymmetry is 
too strong, we can now begin to see that one-way or exclusive asymmetry 
occurs only within the vertical structure of the face-to-face encounter. 
In ordinary circumstances, when we deliberate, choose, and act, the 
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relations we have with others are interactive, often symmetrical and 
reciprocal, and interdependent to some degree. Within the horizontal 
structure of everyday life, then, even if the focus is on you and me, each 
of us is responsible to and for the other; each of us must consider how 
to act toward the other, what to say, what to do. And when there are 
more than two of us, as there always are given the countless number 
of relations in which we are involved at any moment, the complexity 
of every decision and all the various circumstantial factors at play 
mean that our interpersonal responsibilities will always be qualified and 
regimented or orchestrated and arranged. Levinas calls this everyday 
project of employing categories and principles to make decisions about 
how to respond to the claim of others upon us, “justice,” but we might also 
call it moral life and even, at one level, political life (TI 71–2; TI 67–8).
In the end, while Levinas’ conception of what grounds moral 
normativity in our social and political lives is utterly particular, 
involving an infinitely ramified network of face-to-face relations, it is also 
completely universal, in that every person is related to every other in 
the same way and with the same original responsibility to each and 
every other person. Our social lives consist of a “fraternity” (OB 82; 
AE 104), as Levinas calls it, and it involves a form of mutual respect 
of every person for every other, but this respect still refers to each 
person’s infinite responsibility to every other person. While the subject’s 
encounter with the other is unconditionally passive and asymmetrical 
at what we are calling the vertical level, our relations with others are 
often reciprocal and interdependent at the level of ordinary life. For 
Levinas, therefore, the infinite asymmetry characteristic of the face-
to-face encounter does not exclude symmetry in the second-person 
relation but rather conditions its very possibility. 
10. Conclusion
Levinas’ brief comments on Fichte tell us that he did not study Fichte’s 
writings systematically. If anything, Levinas’ knowledge of Fichte 
was based on the Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, which 
introduces the concept of the I as the first principle of all philosophy. 
Given his limited focus on this text, it is not surprising that Levinas’ 
comments are of a critical bent, since Fichte’s privileging of the I would 
have struck him as yet another instance in the history of philosophy where 
consciousness, reason, and being take priority. As we have seen, Fichte’s 
later works, Foundations of Natural Right and The System of Ethics, both 
assign the second person a central role. In this paper, we have tried to 
show that important differences separate Levinas and Fichte, differences 
that trace back to their ideas of how philosophy should proceed and where 
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philosophy should begin. But we have also uncovered a set of affinities 
in how they view the second-person relation, and these affinities are of 
lasting value, if only in raising a challenge to much of the scholarship 
today on the second-person concept. For all their differences, Levinas 
and Fichte agree that second-person responsibility is an asymmetrical 
relation, and this claim, while not part of our current philosophical 
discourse, certainly merits further study.
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